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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Brittany A. Dunn-Pirio *
Timothy J. Huffstutter **
Mason D. Williams ***
INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys recent developments in criminal procedure
and law in Virginia. Because of space limitations, the authors have
limited their discussion to the most significant published appellate
decisions and legislation.
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Appellate Procedure
In Stacey v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia determined that Stacey had waived a challenge to the court’s authority to order the euthanization of her dangerous dog because she
had failed to raise the issue on appeal from her conviction for owning a dangerous dog.1 Several years after her conviction, Stacey
argued for the first time that the Albemarle County Circuit Court
lacked the authority to order the euthanization of her dangerous
dog, which the circuit court had ordered as a condition of her suspended sentence.2 The court of appeals determined that the law of
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*** Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Section, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Virginia. J.D., 2017, Washington and Lee University School of Law;
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1. 73 Va. App. 85, 95, 854 S.E.2d 668, 672 (2021).
2. Id. at 94, 854 S.E.2d at 672.
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the case doctrine barred consideration of the issue because Stacey
had failed to challenge the condition of suspended sentence on her
first appeal.3 The appellate court, therefore, affirmed the judgment
of the circuit court.4
In Delp v. Commonwealth, the court of appeals considered
whether the appellant waived his right to appeal the trial court’s
denial of his motion for new counsel.5 Assuming without deciding
that recent Supreme Court of the United States cases modified Virginia’s rule that a guilty plea is a waiver of all nonjurisdictional
rulings and cures all constitutional defects, the court held that
Delp waived his right to an appeal because (1) the trial court found
his pleas and waiver of rights “were entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently,” and (2) Delp confirmed to the court
that his counsel had shown him the evidence as instructed which
was the basis for his motion for new counsel.6
In Gomez v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
refused to consider the appellant’s arguments on appeal that there
was a fatal variance in his indictments because he waived this issue on appeal when he failed to object to it during the trial.7 The
court reaffirmed the principle that a fatal variance in an indictment will only be set aside after a verdict has been rendered if it is
so defective that it violates the appellant’s constitutional rights.8
In Riddick v. Commonwealth, Riddick was tried and convicted
of several driving offenses in the general district court.9 He noted
an appeal to the Chesapeake City Circuit Court where he was convicted in a bench trial.10 On appeal, he argued that the circuit court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the record did not contain a jury trial waiver.11 The Court of Appeals of Virginia determined that the circuit court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction
over an appeal from misdemeanor convictions in the district

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 94–95, 854 S.E.2d at 672.
Id. at 95, 854 S.E.2d at 672–73.
72 Va. App. 227, 230, 843 S.E.2d 758, 760 (2020).
Id. at 241–42, 843 S.E.2d at 766.
72 Va. App. 173, 178–79, 843 S.E.2d 379, 382–83 (2020).
Id. at 176, 843 S.E.2d at 381.
72 Va. App. 132, 137, 842 S.E.2d 419, 421 (2020).
Id. at 137, 842 S.E.2d at 421–22.
Id. at 138–39, 842 S.E.2d at 422.
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court.12 The court did not reach the issue of a waiver of a jury trial
because Riddick had not raised it in an assignment of error.13
In Nelson v. Commonwealth, the court of appeals addressed Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 1:1.14 Nelson challenged the trial
court’s denial of her motion for a new trial.15 Although the last order entered in the case was the conviction order, the Staunton City
Circuit Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion because twenty-one days had passed from the entry of the final
order.16 In the trial court, Nelson agreed that Rule 1:1 applied.17
On appeal, Nelson argued that Rule 1:1 did not apply.18 Although
the court of appeals noted the trial court committed error because
the actual final order—the sentencing order—had not been entered, it ultimately dismissed Nelson’s appeal because her attorney
approbated and reprobated.19 The court of appeals refused to apply
Rule 5A:18’s ends of justice exception because there is no ends of
justice exception to the approbate and reprobate doctrine.20
B. Automobile Stops and Searches
In Bagley v. Commonwealth, Bagley challenged his conviction
for possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance with intent
to distribute, second offense.21 The evidence at trial established
that officers received a call for a disorderly situation and report of
a brandished firearm.22 Upon arriving at the scene and finding a
vehicle and occupant in the driver’s seat that matched the description given, the officers noticed the appellant, “engage in ‘furtive
movement,’ ‘very rapidly’ ‘throwing’ or ‘shooting’ his hands
‘straight down,’ toward the bottom half of the car.”23 After making

12.
13.
14.
2021).
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 143–45, 842 S.E.2d at 425–26.
Id. at 145–46, 842 S.E.2d at 426.
71 Va. App. 397, 402–03, 837 S.E.2d 60, 62 (2020); VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:1 (Repl. Vol.
Id. at 402, 837 S.E.2d at 62.
Id. at 401, 837 S.E.2d at 61–62.
Id. at 401, 837 S.E.2d. at 61–62.
Id. at 404, 837 S.E.2d at 63.
Id. at 403–05, 837 S.E.2d at 62–63.
Id. at 405, 837 S.E.2d at 63–64; VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:18 (Repl. Vol. 2021).
73 Va. App. 1, 8, 854 S.E.2d 177, 180 (2021).
Id. at 8–9, 854 S.E.2d at 180.
Id. at 9, 854 S.E.2d at 180–81.
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these movements, the appellant opened the car door, got out, and
walked quickly toward a nearby apartment building.24 The officers
stopped him from going inside in order to speak to him about the
alleged disturbance and frisked the appellant for weapons.25 The
officers then conducted a protective sweep of the driver’s seat of the
vehicle and found white powder and a digital scale in the space
underneath it, where it appeared the appellant had been reaching.26 A subsequent search of the rest of the vehicle revealed over
eighty grams of crack and powder cocaine.27
The appellant argued that the Henrico County Circuit Court
erred by denying his motion to suppress, as the search of the vehicle was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.28 The court of
appeals found that the circumstances the officers were confronted
with when they arrived at the scene matched the details of the description they were given by the complainant, who had provided
identifying information to the dispatcher, allowing the officers to
give the tip more weight than an anonymous caller’s; thus, the evidence supported the reasonable inference that the appellant
might have committed the brandishing or have information about
it.29 Further, the appellant’s actions upon the officers’ arrival
heightened the officers’ suspicion, allowing the officers to reasonably act to minimize any threat by conducting the pat-down.30 However, the fact that the pat-down did not reveal any weapons only
served to heighten the officers’ suspicion regarding the appellant’s
furtive movements immediately prior to hastily leaving the car;
thus, the same facts which supported the frisk of the appellant supported the search of his immediate surroundings in the vehicle
when no weapon was found on his person.31
In McArthur v. Commonwealth, the court of appeals overturned
the Richmond City Circuit Court’s denial of appellant’s motion to
suppress.32 The facts established that officers initiated a traffic
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 10, 854 S.E.2d at 181.
Id. at 10, 854 S.E.2d at 181.
Id. at 10, 854 S.E.2d at 181.
Id. at 10–11, 854 S.E.2d at 181.
Id. at 12, 854 S.E.2d at 182.
Id. at 17–18, 20–21, 854 S.E.2d at 184–86.
Id. at 18, 854 S.E.2d at 185.
Id. at 19, 854 S.E.2d at 185–86.
72 Va. App. 352, 357, 369, 845 S.E.2d 249, 251, 257 (2020).
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stop on the appellant in a high-crime area for a defective fog light.33
The appellant, who was polite and cooperative, informed the officers that the vehicle was his girlfriend’s, that as far as he knew
there were no weapons in the vehicle, and he refused consent to
search the vehicle.34 While the first officer spoke with McArthur,
the second was running the appellant’s information through police
databases, which returned an alert that he was thought to have
been a member of the “Crips” gang during a previous incarceration.35 After the appellant refused consent, the officer ordered him
out of the vehicle, at which point he began to sweat profusely and
stated to his girlfriend on the phone that “they are locking me
up.”36 A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed a 9mm handgun
under the driver’s seat, and the appellant was arrested.37
The appellant filed a motion to suppress, which was denied by
the trial court, and he was subsequently found guilty of possession
of a firearm as a violent felon.38 The court of appeals agreed that
the firearm should have been suppressed, finding that the appellant’s conduct during the stop did not give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion, as he was polite and cooperative and made no furtive movements, and petitioner’s location in a high-crime area,
standing alone, was insufficient to support the search.39
In Joyce v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia determined that a police officer had a reasonable suspicion to initiate
a traffic stop.40 Based on an anonymous tip, police were on the lookout for a green sedan.41 An officer located a green sedan parked at
a drug store; the driver was drinking from a blue can.42 When the
police officer moved closer, the car drove away.43 The officer

33. Id. at 357, 845 S.E.2d at 251.
34. Id. at 357, 845 S.E.2d at 251–52.
35. Id. at 357, 845 S.E.2d at 251.
36. Id. at 358, 845 S.E.2d at 252.
37. Id. at 358, 845 S.E.2d at 252.
38. Id. at 358, 845 S.E.2d at 252.
39. Id. at 361–63, 845 S.E.2d at 253–54 (holding also that the collective knowledge doctrine did not apply, as the officer with the appellant was not informed by the other officer of
the appellant’s alleged gang affiliation until after the search).
40. 72 Va. App. 9, 12, 840 S.E.2d 571, 573 (2020).
41. Id. at 12, 840 S.E.2d at 573.
42. Id. at 12, 840 S.E.2d at 573.
43. Id. at 12, 840 S.E.2d at 573.
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followed the car to a red light where the car signaled to turn left.44
When the light turned green, the sedan remained motionless for
six or seven seconds, and there were no vehicles in the intersection.45 The officer stopped the green sedan for failure to obey a
green light; Joyce, the driver, had a blood alcohol level of .134.46
Joyce moved to suppress the evidence recovered as a result of the
traffic stop, arguing that his failure to move through the green signal did not provide reasonable suspicion to support a stop.47 The
court of appeals disagreed, ruling that some prolonged stops at
green lights violate the statute, and others do not.48 In this case,
the court concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion that
Joyce failed to obey a green signal because he remained motionless
at the green light for six or seven seconds, and there were no vehicles in the intersection.49
In Williams v. Commonwealth, Williams was convicted of possessing a stolen firearm and possession of marijuana, subsequent
offense.50 A police officer stopped Williams after seeing his car
speed and swerve.51 The officer asked Williams if there were any
firearms in the car; Williams responded that he had a concealed
permit.52 The officer asked four times where the firearm was, and
Williams “responded vaguely that it was concealed.”53 The officer
went to his car to write two summonses; when he returned, he
asked Williams to step out of the car to get him away from a large
dog and to observe Williams’s motor skills.54 As Williams stepped
out, the officer observed the butt of a large revolver in Williams’s
jacket and detected the odor of burnt marijuana; the officer seized
the gun for safety purposes.55 The officer ran the serial number
through a database and determined it was stolen; when so informed, Williams did not appear surprised and said that he bought

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 12, 840 S.E.2d at 573.
Id. at 12, 840 S.E.2d at 573.
Id. at 13, 840 S.E.2d at 573.
Id. at 13, 840 S.E.2d at 573.
Id. at 16, 840 S.E.2d at 575.
Id. at 16, 840 S.E.2d at 575.
71 Va. App. 462, 471–72, 837 S.E.2d 91, 96 (2020).
Id. at 472, 837 S.E.2d at 96.
Id. at 472, 837 S.E.2d at 96.
Id. at 472, 837 S.E.2d at 96.
Id. at 472–73, 837 S.E.2d at 96.
Id. at 473, 837 S.E.2d at 96.
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it from “a person.”56 The officer performed a field test on a leafy
substance seized from Williams, which indicated it was marijuana.57
On appeal, Williams challenged the denial of a motion to suppress concerning the firearm.58 The Court of Appeals of Virginia
determined that the officer had probable cause to seize the firearm
because Williams was vague when answering the officer’s questions, and, when Williams exited the car, the officer could see the
butt of the gun in Williams’s jacket pocket, meaning that there was
a threat to officer safety.59 Once the officer had lawfully seized the
gun, the appellate court determined that there was no Fourth
Amendment issue with the observation of the gun’s serial number
and running it through a database.60
C. Brady Obligations61
In Warnick v. Commonwealth, Warnick was convicted for a murder and robbery which occurred in 1988.62 The facts at trial established that, on the day of the murder, the appellant and the victim
attended a party along the Shenandoah River.63 The appellant, the
victim, and an unknown third party went on a “beer run” to a
nearby store, and when the appellant and the third party returned,
the victim was not with them.64 Warnick claimed that the Loudoun
County Circuit Court improperly admitted a witness’s testimony
that she had given birth the night before the victim’s disappearance, as she had previously told police that she had given birth
prior to the date of the river party, and the Commonwealth committed a Brady violation by failing to turn this over.65 The court of
appeals denied the claim, finding no Brady violation had been committed as the testimony was not material to the issues in the case,

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 473, 837 S.E.2d at 96.
Id. at 473, 837 S.E.2d at 97.
Id. at 474, 837 S.E.2d at 97.
Id. at 477–78, 837 S.E.2d at 98–99.
Id. at 478–81, 837 S.E.2d at 99–100.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
72 Va. App. 251, 256, 844 S.E.2d 414, 417 (2020).
Id. at 257, 844 S.E.2d at 417.
Id. at 258, 844 S.E.2d at 417.
Id. at 269, 844 S.E.2d at 423.
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and the evidence was made available to the appellant, who crossexamined the witness about the statement, in time to use at trial.66
In Church v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
determined that the Commonwealth had met its Brady obligations
during Church’s trial for object sexual penetration of a child and
taking indecent liberties with a child.67 At trial, Church’s counsel
raised an objection during cross-examination of the child victim; he
argued that the Commonwealth had failed to disclose that the victim said that Church had threatened her sister and that this testimony was inconsistent with her statements to the medical examiner.68 The next day, the prosecutor reported that the victim
reported that, the morning after the abuse, Church had asked to
abuse her again, and the victim could not identify a pair of underwear as hers.69 Church declined the opportunity to question the
victim and instead made a motion to dismiss.70 The court of appeals
determined that the child’s inability to identify her underwear was
not a Brady violation because this evidence was not exculpatory.71
Concerning the victim’s allegedly inconsistent statements and the
stepmother’s testimony, the appellate court determined that the
Commonwealth had met its Brady obligations because Brady is not
violated when evidence is made available during trial, as it was
here.72
D. Confrontation Issues
In Alvarez Saucedo v. Commonwealth, the appellant asserted
that the video recording of the victim’s child forensic interview violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront because the victim
did not “testify” when she could not remember specifics about her
interview; the court of appeals disagreed.73 The court explained
that the Confrontation Clause was satisfied when the appellant

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 269–70, 844 S.E.2d at 423.
71 Va. App. 107, 112, 834 S.E.2d 477, 480 (2019).
Id. at 115, 834 S.E.2d at 482.
Id. at 115, 834 S.E.2d at 482.
Id. at 116, 834 S.E.2d at 482.
Id. at 118–19, 834 S.E.2d at 483–84.
Id. at 119–21, 834 S.E.2d at 484–85.
71 Va. App. 31, 45–46, 833 S.E.2d 900, 907 (2019).
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cross-examined the minor victim about her inability to remember
the interview and discussed this issue in closing.74
E. Deferred Proceedings
In Vandyke v. Commonwealth, Vandyke argued that the Richmond City Circuit Court misinterpreted Virginia Code section
18.2-258.1, criminalizing obtaining morphine by fraud, and abused
its discretion by refusing to allow a deferred disposition.75 After the
trial court “found the appellant guilty as charged,” Vandyke asked
the court to defer a finding.76 Ten days later, the trial court entered
an order stating that it had found Vandyke guilty.77 Vandyke argued that the court had merely found facts sufficient to convict and
requested that the court defer the finding.78 The court of appeals
affirmed the case and explained that the trial court lost the authority to enter a deferred disposition because “a trial court’s inherent
authority to defer disposition lasts until the court finds the defendant guilty” and that this principle also applies to section 18.2258.1.79
F. Double Jeopardy
In the consolidated appeals of Evans v. Commonwealth and Conway v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia confronted
the issue of whether Virginia Code section 19.2-294 precludes a
prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon when
the defendant was convicted in a prior prosecution of carrying a
concealed weapon arising out of the same circumstances.80 The defendants argued that, under the plain language of section 19.2-294,
their convictions for possession of a firearm as convicted felons
must be dismissed.81 The Court found that section 19.2-294 prevents the Commonwealth from subjecting an accused to multiple

74. Id. at 46, 833 S.E.2d at 907.
75. 71 Va. App. 723, 727, 840 S.E.2d 8, 9 (2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-258.1 (Repl. Vol.
2014).
76. Id. at 727–28, 840 S.E.2d at 10.
77. Id. at 728, 840 S.E.2d at 10.
78. Id. at 728, 840 S.E.2d at 10.
79. Id. at 732, 736–37, 840 S.E.2d at 12, 14 (emphasis omitted).
80. Evans v. Commonwealth, 299 Va. 330, 332–33, 850 S.E.2d 669, 670–71 (2020);
§ 19.2-294 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
81. Evans, 299 Va. at 334, 850 S.E.2d at 671–72.

46

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:37

prosecutions.82 However, the Court found that section 19.2-294
bars a subsequent prosecution based on the “same act.”83 The Court
held that the proper test to determine if double jeopardy bars prosecution requires three elements to be met: (1) the defendant was
previously prosecuted; (2) the prior prosecution resulted in a conviction; and (3) the prior prosecution was based on the “same act.”84
Applying that test to the two cases before it, the Court found
that both defendants were separately convicted of carrying a concealed weapon in a first prosecution and possessing a firearm as a
convicted felon in a second prosecution.85 The Court held that the
defendants would have first had to possess the guns and then, in a
separate act, conceal them.86 Thus, the additional act of concealing
the weapons made it a different act than possessing the weapons.87
Accordingly, section 19.2-294 did not bar the successive prosecutions, and the Court affirmed the defendants’ convictions.88
G. Duty of the Prosecutor
In Price v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed and remanded Price’s conviction for assault and battery.89
The Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office declined to participate and
chose to allow the case to continue as a “citizen’s complaint.”90 The
attorney who represented the victim in a civil suit against Price
entered an appearance as a private prosecutor.91 The court of appeals observed that private prosecutors are permitted in Virginia,
but only to assist the public prosecutor in the case, and the public
prosecutor must remain in control of the prosecution.92 The appellate court concluded that the public prosecutor’s office appeared to
have no control of the case, and the private prosecutor had a conflict of interest that violated Price’s due process rights due to the
attorney’s simultaneous representation of the victim in a civil suit
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 335, 850 S.E.2d at 672.
Id. at 335, 850 S.E.2d at 672.
Id. at 340, 850 S.E.2d at 675.
Id. at 340, 850 S.E.2d at 675.
Id. at 341, 850 S.E.2d at 675.
Id. at 341, 850 S.E.2d at 675.
Id. at 341, 850 S.E.2d at 675.
72 Va. App. 474, 849 S.E.2d 140 (2020).
Id. at 483, 849 S.E.2d at 144.
Id. at 483, 849 S.E.2d at 144.
Id. at 486–88, 849 S.E.2d at 145–47.
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against Price.93 The court of appeals went on to conclude that such
an error was not subject to harmless error analysis due to the “fundamental and pervasive” prejudicial effects on the proceedings as
well as the need to demonstrate the appearance of justice.94
H. Evidence
In Kenner v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the titles of files depicting child pornography
found on Kenner’s computer.95 Kenner was convicted of, inter alia,
custodial sexual abuse.96 The child victim testified that Kenner
sexually abused her while showing her pornographic videos depicting adults on his computer.97 The Court concluded that the titles of
child pornography files were relevant evidence of other crimes to
demonstrate Kenner’s inappropriate sexualized attitude toward
children generally and the victim specifically.98 Additionally, this
evidence established Kenner’s motive, method, and intent.99
In Warnick v. Commonwealth, Warnick alleged that the
Loudoun County Circuit Court erred in refusing to allow him to
introduce evidence of third-party guilt.100 The Court of Appeals of
Virginia determined that there was no merit to this claim, as the
witness that the appellant sought to call would have testified to
hearsay evidence that another individual had told the witness that
the appellant committed the crime.101 Although the declarant was
deceased and therefore unavailable, the reliability requirement
was not satisfied because there was no other evidence linking the
declarant to the killing, other than his presence at the party, along
with forty other people, on the day of the murder.102
The appellant further alleged that the trial court erred by allowing a witness to testify under Rule 2:613(a)(ii) that she had made

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 488–90, 849 S.E.2d at 147–48.
Id. at 490–91, 849 S.E.2d at 148.
299 Va. 414, 427, 854 S.E.2d 493, 500 (2021).
Id. at 418, 854 S.E.2d at 495.
Id. at 419, 854 S.E.2d at 496.
Id. at 424–27, 854 S.E.2d at 499–500.
Id. at 427, 854 S.E.2d at 500.
72 Va. App. 251, 256, 844 S.E.2d 414, 417 (2020).
Id. at 264–65, 844 S.E.2d at 421.
Id. at 264–65, 844 S.E.2d at 421.
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inconsistent statements regarding whether or not the appellant
had killed the victim in this case because she was afraid of the appellant because he “raped women.”103 The court of appeals held
that, although the trial court’s reliance on Rule 2:613(a)(ii) was
misplaced as the appellant was not attempting to introduce extrinsic evidence of the witness’ inconsistent statement, the court
reached the correct result because caselaw establishes that a witness may be allowed to explain a prior inconsistent statement.104
Thus, the witness was permitted to testify as to her reasons for
making inconsistent statements once the appellant opened the
door, and the trial court correctly denied the appellant’s motion for
a mistrial on that basis.105
In Chenevert v. Commonwealth, the court of appeals held that
Virginia Code section 19.2-268.3 permitted the admission of a letter and drawings produced by a child sexual abuse victim.106 The
evidence at trial showed that the child victim gave her mother a
letter stating that the appellant had inappropriate sexual contact
with her.107 The victim was subsequently interviewed by a forensic
interviewer, and the child drew or wrote on provided paper.108 During the appellant’s criminal proceedings, the Commonwealth filed
a motion pursuant to section 19.2-268.3 to admit the letter, the
drawings, and a video of the forensic interview, which was granted
by the trial court.109
The court of appeals ruled that the letter was covered by the
statute, as there was no indication in the plain language of the
statute that it was meant to only cover statements made during
forensic interviews; rather, it applied broadly to any statements
made by a child victim describing the offense, which clearly included the letter.110 The Court also determined that the drawings
were admissible as they were clearly statements under Rule
2:801(a).111 Accordingly, both the letter and drawings were

103. Id. at 266–67, 844 S.E.2d at 422; VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:613(a)(ii) (Repl. Vol. 2021).
104. Warnick, 72 Va. App. at 267, 844 S.E.2d at 422.
105. Id. at 267, 844 S.E.2d at 422.
106. 72 Va. App. 47, 51–52, 840 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-268.3
(Cum. Supp. 2021).
107. Chenevert, 72 Va. App. at 52, 840 S.E.2d at 592.
108. Id. at 53, 840 S.E.2d at 592.
109. Id. at 53, 840 S.E.2d at 593.
110. Id. at 57, 840 S.E.2d at 594–95.
111. Id. at 58, 840 S.E.2d at 595; VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:801(a) (Repl. Vol. 2021).
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properly admitted, and the appellant’s convictions were affirmed.112
Antonio Jones was charged with aggravated sexual battery of a
child at least thirteen years old, but younger than eighteen.113 At
trial, the Commonwealth sought to introduce portions of an audio
recording in which the victim and the victim’s mother confronted
Jones about the incident.114 The court of appeals concluded that the
victim’s statements on the recording were not hearsay, but were
admitted to provide context to Jones’ statements (which were admissible as admissions by a party).115
In Murray v. Commonwealth, Murray was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon.116 The evidence established that an
officer attempted to initiate a traffic stop on her for a taillight issue, but she fled, dropped a magazine for a .45 caliber handgun,
and failed to stop at several stop signs.117 Police recovered a .45
caliber handgun under the front passenger seat of the vehicle.118
The appellant alleged that the Hampton City Circuit Court erred
by allowing a detective to testify that the gun was “designed to propel a missile by an action of explosion by any combustible,” as he
was not qualified as an expert witness.119 The court of appeals disagreed, finding that Rule 2:701 allows opinion testimony by a lay
witness if it is reasonably based on the personal experience or observations of the witness; thus, the detective’s opinion which was
based on his training, experience, and observations was admissible.120
In Hicks v. Commonwealth, the court of appeals addressed
whether the Mecklenburg County Circuit Court erred when it excluded the appellant’s proffered impeachment evidence that the
child victim had previously made false accusations of sexual misconduct against others under Rule 2:608(b)(1).121 The Court noted
112. Chenevert, 72 Va. App. at 59–60, 840 S.E.2d at 596.
113. Jones v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 597, 601, 838 S.E.2d 563, 564 (2020).
114. Id. at 601, 838 S.E.2d at 564.
115. Id. at 604–05, 838 S.E.2d at 566.
116. 71 Va. App. 449, 452–53, 837 S.E.2d 85, 87 (2020).
117. Id. at 453, 837 S.E.2d at 87.
118. Id. at 453, 837 S.E.2d at 87.
119. Id. at 454, 456–57, 837 S.E.2d at 87–89.
120. Id. at 456–58, 837 S.E.2d at 89; VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:701 (Repl. Vol. 2021).
121. 71 Va. App. 255, 275–76, 835 S.E.2d 95, 105 (2019) (affirming the appellant’s convictions for rape, aggravated sexual battery, and indecent liberties); VA. SUP. CT. R.
2:608(b)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2021).
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that “a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it concludes
that an alleged offender’s [self] denial [or denial of others] is insufficient to support the admission of his . . . testimony to prove a prior
false accusation for impeachment purposes.”122 The court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because
the appellant failed to make a threshold showing that such allegations were made and were false.123
In Raspberry v. Commonwealth, Raspberry was convicted of a
number of firearm and drug offenses.124 On appeal, he argued that
the Hampton City Circuit Court erred in admitting the court records regarding his prior criminal history.125 At trial, Raspberry objected to the admission of three certified orders because they were
not physically signed by a judge.126 The orders, however, were electronically signed and contained the embossed seal of the court.127
The Court of Appeals of Virginia determined that the orders were
admissible pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-389.128
In Lambert v. Commonwealth, Lambert was convicted of a bevy
of drug offenses and three counts of sex trafficking.129 The Court of
Appeals of Virginia determined that the Chesterfield County Circuit Court properly admitted evidence that Lambert was a member
of the “Bloods,” because that evidence tended to prove that Lambert used intimidation to prostitute the victim.130 The court of appeals also determined that the trial court had properly limited
Lambert’s cross examination of the victim because the jury was already aware of the victim’s prior drug use and criminal sentence,
and additional evidence may have confused the jury.131 Additionally, evidence of the victim’s prior voluntary prostitution was not
relevant and may have confused the jury.132

122.
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Hicks, 71 Va. App. at 277, 835 S.E.2d at 106.
Id. at 278, 835 S.E.2d at 106–07.
71 Va. App. 19, 22, 833 S.E.2d 894, 896 (2019).
Id. at 22, 833 S.E.2d at 896.
Id. at 24, 833 S.E.2d at 896–97.
Id. at 24, 833 S.E.2d at 897.
Id. at 26–28, 833 S.E.2d at 898–99; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-389 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
70 Va. App. 740, 745–46, 833 S.E.2d 468, 471 (2019).
Id. at 750–52, 833 S.E.2d at 473–75.
Id. at 753–56, 833 S.E.2d at 475–76.
Id. at 756–58, 833 S.E.2d at 476–77.
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I. Indictments
In Warnick v. Commonwealth, Warnick challenged the Loudoun
County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for denial of
his due process rights due to the twenty-seven year delay in indicting the defendant.133 The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the
appellant had failed to show either actual prejudice or improper
purpose on the part of the Commonwealth; although the appellant
proffered that thirteen witnesses had died due to the delay, he
failed to state what they would have testified to that would have
helped the appellant, and further, there was no evidence that the
delay was intentional, rather than due to witnesses’ fear of appellant.134 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.135
J. Interrogations
In Alvarez Saucedo v. Commonwealth, the appellant challenged
the denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to a detective.136 While participating in a voluntary polygraph examination, the detective told the appellant that the appellant should
“‘walk out of the room’ if appellant’s ‘tongue touched [the minor’s]
vagina.”137 The appellant argued that this transformed his voluntary polygraph examination into a custodial interrogation and violated his Miranda138 rights.139 The court of appeals held that the
statements did not violate his Fifth Amendment right because the
appellant participated in the polygraph voluntarily, was not restrained or handcuffed, the detective assured the appellant he
could leave at any time and demonstrated that the door was not
locked, and the appellant appeared relaxed throughout the interview.140
In Bass v. Commonwealth, Bass alleged that the Cumberland
County Circuit Court erred by denying his motion to suppress due
to the police’s denial of his right to an attorney during an
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72 Va. App. at 272–73, 844 S.E.2d at 425.
Id. at 273, 844 S.E.2d at 425.
Id. at 273–74, 844 S.E.2d at 425.
71 Va. App. 31, 37, 833 S.E.2d 900, 903 (2019).
Id. at 42, 833 S.E.2d at 905.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
71 Va. App. at 40, 833 S.E.2d at 904.
Id. at 43, 833 S.E.2d at 905–06.
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interview.141 The evidence established that, during an interview
with police, after he had been Mirandized, the appellant made the
statement “Is there any way uh I could have um like a an attorney
or something present or a lawyer or something and um maybe a
like a mental health professional?” and later, “What difference
would it make if I um waited for like a lawyer and like a mental
health professional?”142 The court of appeals held that the trial
court’s finding that the appellant’s words were a question, not a
clear and unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel, was supported by the evidence, and thus, that a reasonable officer would
only have understood that appellant, at most, might be invoking
the right to counsel, not clearly and unambiguously requesting
one.143 Accordingly, the trial court did not err, and the convictions
were affirmed.144
K. Jury Instructions
In Dandridge v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed and remanded Dandridge’s conviction for seconddegree murder, ruling that the Chesterfield County Circuit Court
should have instructed the jury as to voluntary manslaughter.145
The Court concluded that there was at least a scintilla of evidence
that Dandridge acted without malice and in a furor brevis in the
killing of the victim.146 Furthermore, the Court noted that the trial
court had instructed the jury as to self-defense, and it would be an
“unusual” case in which the evidence generated a self-defense instruction, but not voluntary manslaughter.147
In Richard v. Commonwealth, Richard assigned error to the
Floyd County Circuit Court’s (1) denial of her motion to strike the
conspiracy charge because she claimed the evidence only proved a
single buyer-seller transaction occurred and (2) refusal to instruct
the jury “that a single buyer-seller transaction may not constitute
a conspiracy.”148 Although the Court of Appeals of Virginia found

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

70 Va. App. 522, 529–30, 829 S.E.2d 554, 558 (2019).
Id. at 529–30, 829 S.E.2d at 558.
Id. at 540–41, 829 S.E.2d at 563.
Id. at 543, 829 S.E.2d at 564.
72 Va. App. 669, 686, 852 S.E.2d 488, 496 (2021).
Id. at 682–85, 852 S.E.2d at 494–95.
Id. at 683, 852 S.E.2d at 494.
72 Va. App. 598, 606, 851 S.E.2d 68, 72 (2020).
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the evidence was sufficient, it reversed the conviction because
“more than a scintilla” of credible evidence supported the jury instruction.”149
L. Jury Trials
In Jiddou v. Commonwealth, Jiddou argued that the Chesterfield County Circuit Court erred in ordering a jury trial upon the
Commonwealth’s request.150 The Court of Appeals of Virginia determined that the accused does not have a constitutional right to a
bench trial, and the Commonwealth may equally elect a jury
trial.151 The court of appeals determined that the Commonwealth
properly elected a jury trial and had not previously waived it.152
In Ramos v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
determined that the Charlottesville City Circuit Court had not
erred in refusing to dismiss potential jurors who were aware that
another person was convicted the prior day for a malicious wounding of the same victim as Ramos.153 During voir dire, several potential jurors stated that they were aware that another person was
convicted the prior day, but their knowledge varied and came from
media reports.154 The Court declined to find a per se rule for disqualification, especially because the potential jurors’ knowledge
varied and did not come from official proceedings.155 Additionally,
the Court determined that Ramos had waived any challenge to
venue and the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for
malicious wounding, even though Ramos punched the victim
once.156
In Goodwin v. Commonwealth, Goodwin alleged that the Charlottesville City Circuit Court erred in refusing to strike several jurors.157 During voir dire, several jurors admitted to knowledge of
the “Unite the Right” rally through media reports and that some
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Id. at 616–17, 851 S.E.2d at 77.
71 Va. App. 353, 371, 836 S.E.2d 700, 708 (2019).
Id. at 372, 836 S.E.2d at 709.
Id. at 372, 836 S.E.2d at 709.
71 Va. App. 150, 153–54, 834 S.E.2d 499, 500 (2019).
Id. at 155–56, 834 S.E.2d at 501.
Id. at 156–60, 834 S.E.2d at 502–03.
Id. at 160–63, 834 S.E.2d at 504–05.
71 Va. App. 125, 128–29, 834 S.E.2d 487, 488 (2019).
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were aware of and participated in counter-protests.158 The court of
appeals disagreed, finding that while some of the jurors gave some
equivocal answers, the larger context and all the responses given
during the voir dire of each juror were less equivocal and showed
that they could be fair and impartial; thus, the trial court did not
err.159 Further, the court held that although some of the jurors indicated sympathies counter to the “Unite the Right” protesters,
none of them were directly affected by the violence, and all of them
indicated that they could put aside any bias or prejudice and give
the appellant a fair trial on the merits.160 Thus, none of the jurors
displayed a fixed opinion which repelled the presumption of innocence; accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to strike
them for cause.161
M. Pleas
In Meekins v. Commonwealth, after pleading guilty to voluntary
manslaughter, the appellant appealed the Richcmond City Circuit
Court’s exclusion of specific prior bad acts that would have established the victim had a violent, aggressive, and controlling character, “particularly towards women and while under the influence of
cocaine” at the sentencing hearing.162 The Court of Appeals of Virginia held the trial court did not abuse its discretion because, by
pleading no contest to voluntary manslaughter, the appellant
waived her right to present a self-defense case and the evidence
she tried to present at the sentencing hearing would have excused
her criminal act.163
N. Right to Counsel
In Walker v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
concluded that Walker had waived his right to counsel by his conduct.164 Over the course of the litigation, the Hampton City Circuit
Court had appointed eight lawyers to serve as Walker’s counsel,
158. Id. at 130–34, 834 S.E.2d at 489–91.
159. Id. at 137–38, 834 S.E.2d at 492–93.
160. Id. at 139–43, 834 S.E.2d at 493–95.
161. Id. at 139–43, 834 S.E.2d at 493–95.
162. 72 Va. App. 61, 64–67, 73, 841 S.E.2d 365, 366–68, 370 (2020) (finding that any
error was harmless after the appellant also challenged the exclusion of hearsay evidence).
163. Id. at 70–71, 841 S.E.2d at 369.
164. 71 Va. App. 665, 677–78, 839 S.E.2d 123, 128–29 (2020).
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and each time, counsel filed motions to withdraw.165 The court cautioned Walker multiple times that he needed to cooperate with
counsel, and his refusal to do so could result in a waiver of counsel.166 Walker proceeded pro se at trial and argued on appeal that
the circuit court had violated his right to counsel.167 The court of
appeals determined that Walker had waived his right to counsel
based on his conduct; the Court stated that Walker purposefully
developed conflicts with each counsel as part of “an intentional
strategy of delay.”168 The court of appeals concluded that Walker’s
conduct constituted an abuse of the right to counsel, and the trial
court attempted multiple times to caution Walker.169
O. Role of the Defense Attorney
In Robinson v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
determined that Robinson had procedurally defaulted the issue of
whether the Prince William County Circuit Court had properly denied his motion to sever.170 Robinson was charged with three
counts of grand larceny and one count each of robbery, use or display of a firearm in the commission of a robbery, and abduction.171
Prior to trial, his counsel filed a motion to sever the grand larceny
charges from the others.172 After conferring with counsel, Robinson
decided to waive a jury trial.173 Counsel acknowledged that proceeding with a bench trial resolved the severance issue.174 Upon
returning from a recess, Robinson’s counsel informed the court that
Robinson was renewing the motion to sever, but that counsel disagreed.175 The court of appeals determined that Robinson had not
properly made a motion to sever because such a motion is an example of a tactical decision made by counsel.176 Because it was
clear that counsel was not advancing the motion that Robinson
wanted to pursue, and such a motion was clearly within the
165.
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Id. at 668–72, 839 S.E.2d at 124–26.
Id. at 668–72, 839 S.E.2d at 124–26.
Id. at 671–72, 839 S.E.2d at 126.
Id. at 675, 839 S.E.2d at 127.
Id. at 675–76, 839 S.E.2d at 127–28.
72 Va. App. 244, 844 S.E.2d 411 (2020).
Id. at 246–47, 844 S.E.2d at 412.
Id. at 247, 844 S.E.2d at 412.
Id. at 247, 844 S.E.2d at 412.
Id. at 247, 844 S.E.2d at 412.
Id. at 247, 844 S.E.2d at 412.
Id. at 248–49, 844 S.E.2d at 413.
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province of counsel to decide, the court of appeals determined that
the motion to sever was not properly before the trial court.177
P. Searches
In Saal v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia confronted the question of whether police entry on a home’s curtilage
to gather information pertaining to a criminal investigation during
pre-dawn hours by conducting a “knock-and-talk” without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.178 The evidence at trial established that a witness observed a vehicle later linked to the appellant driving erratically and with a blown right-front tire late at
night.179 Police were able to track the vehicle to a residential address and arrived at the address around 12:30 AM.180 The officers
approached the house and knocked on the front door.181 There was
no response to the officers’ knocks on the front door; they then followed a path and knocked on a door connected to an illuminated
room, and the appellant answered.182 Upon being questioned by the
police, the appellant made incriminating statements and was arrested for driving under the influence.183
Saal argued that the Virginia Beach City Circuit Court erred in
denying his motion to suppress the statements, as the officers’ entry onto his curtilage at 12:30 AM without a warrant was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment.184 The court of appeals determined that the officers had entered the appellant’s
curtilage but were engaging in a “knock-and-talk,” an exception to
the warrant requirement for a home’s curtilage.185 The Court specified factors to consider in assessing the reasonableness of
nighttime approaches, including the time of the approach, whether
the officer’s approach was open or clandestine, whether the officer
confined himself to the driveway and associated pathways where
the general public would be expected to go, whether lights were on,
and whether cars outside the residence suggested the presence of
177.
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Id. at 250, 844 S.E.2d at 414.
72 Va. App. 413, 418, 848 S.E.2d 612, 614 (2020).
Id. at 418, 848 S.E.2d at 614.
Id. at 418, 848 S.E.2d at 614.
Id. at 419, 848 S.E.2d at 615.
Id. at 419, 848 S.E.2d at 615.
Id. at 419–20, 848 S.E.2d at 615.
Id. at 420, 848 S.E.2d at 615.
Id. at 422–23, 848 S.E.2d at 616–17.
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people who may be awake.186 The Court determined the officer’s
entry onto the curtilage was reasonable because the time of night,
which tended to be less reasonable, was outweighed by the fact that
a witness had recently seen Saal driving and that there were lights
on in the house, indicating that the inhabitant was not asleep.187
Accordingly, the officers’ entry onto the curtilage was reasonable,
and the judgment was affirmed.188
In Bryant v. Commonwealth, Bryant challenged the denial of a
motion to suppress evidence recovered from a suitcase and a
safe.189 Responding to an apartment for a domestic violence situation, officers located Bryant in the parking lot.190 His girlfriend was
taking things to her car from the apartment and said that she was
leaving.191 The girlfriend told police the apartment was in her
name and consented to a search of the apartment.192 Police found
a large suitcase in the master bathroom and a safe on top of the
toilet.193 Police found contraband in the suitcase; the girlfriend
stated that the suitcase belonged to Bryant.194 Police applied for a
search warrant for the safe and recovered ammunition and $7000
in cash from the safe.195
The Williamsburg-James City County Circuit Court denied the
motion to suppress as to the suitcase and the safe.196 The court of
appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, ruling that
the officers reasonably relied on the girlfriend’s consent to search
the suitcase.197 There was no outward identifying information on
the suitcase, and the girlfriend still had items in the apartment;
the police could reasonably assume that the suitcase belonged to
the girlfriend, and her consent encompassed the suitcase.198 The
court of appeals went on to conclude that the search warrant affidavit for the safe, relying solely on the evidence recovered from the
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Id. at 425–26, 848 S.E.2d at 618.
Id. at 427, 848 S.E.2d at 619.
Id. at 429, 848 S.E.2d at 620.
72 Va. App. 179, 184, 843 S.E.2d 383, 385 (2020).
Id. at 182, 843 S.E.2d at 384.
Id. at 182, 843 S.E.2d at 384.
Id. at 183, 843 S.E.2d at 385.
Id. at 184, 843 S.E.2d at 385.
Id. at 184, 843 S.E.2d at 385.
Id. at 184, 843 S.E.2d at 385–86.
Id. at 186, 843 S.E.2d at 386.
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58

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:37

suitcase and the search incident to arrest, was sufficient to provide
probable cause to search the safe.199
Q. Sentencing
In Holloway v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether Virginia Code section 19.2-303.01 permitted a
court to sentence a defendant below the statutory minimum sentence provided by section 18.2-248(C).200 Holloway pled guilty to
possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I or II substance,
third or subsequent offense, and the Norfolk City Circuit Court
sentenced him to the mandatory minimum sentence.201 Holloway
subsequently provided assistance to the Commonwealth in the
prosecution of another person for murder, and the Commonwealth
filed a motion to reduce Holloway’s sentence pursuant to section
19.2-303.01.202 The trial court determined that it did not have any
authority to sentence below the mandatory minimum sentence.203
The appellate court reversed, concluding that section 19.2-303.01
permits a court to sentence below a mandatory minimum when a
defendant provides assistance to the government because the statute begins “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of
court . . . .”204
In Martinez v. Commonwealth, Martinez was convicted of aggravated sexual battery of a child under the age of thirteen.205 The
Augusta County Circuit Court ordered that Martinez be incarcerated with the Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”) until he
reached twenty-one years of age, at which point he was to be transferred to the Department of Corrections (“DOC”); however, the
court suspended all the time to be served in DOC on the condition
that he remain in DJJ custody until his twenty-first birthday.206
After the appellant’s unsatisfactory adjustment to incarceration
with DJJ, the court held a hearing at which it found that the appellant would not benefit from further commitment to DJJ; thus,
199. Id. at 190–91, 843 S.E.2d at 388–89.
200. 72 Va. App. 370, 846 S.E.2d 19 (2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303.01 (Cum. Supp.
2021); § 18.2-248(C) (Repl. Vol. 2014).
201. 72 Va. App. at 371–72, 846 S.E.2d at 19–20.
202. Id. at 372, 846 S.E.2d at 20.
203. Id. at 372, 846 S.E.2d at 20.
204. Id. at 375, 846 S.E.2d at 21.
205. 71 Va. App. 318, 321, 836 S.E.2d 1, 2 (2019).
206. Id. at 321–22, 836 S.E.2d at 2.
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the court ordered that he begin serving the balance of the sentence
imposed in DOC, with all time suspended except for five years.207
The court subsequently held another hearing to clarify its order.208
The appellant alleged that the original order finding that the
appellant was not performing satisfactorily in DJJ and transferring him to DOC was void ab initio as it impermissibly increased
his original sentence and transferred him to DOC prior to his
twenty-first birthday, and that the trial court erroneously identified section 16.1-285.2(E)(i) as governing his transfer.209 The court
of appeals disagreed, finding that although the trial court’s citation
to section 16.1-285.2(E)(i) was incorrect, the court reached the
right result, as the court had the power to revoke the suspended
sentence and transfer him to DOC.210 The condition of suspension
of the DOC sentence that the appellant remain in DJJ custody until he was twenty-one was reasonable given the appellant’s age, the
nature of the crime, and the opportunity for treatment in DJJ, and
the trial court’s order was not rendered void by its citation to the
incorrect statute when it reached the correct result.211 Accordingly,
the trial court’s decisions were affirmed.212
In Lee v. Commonwealth, the appellant argued “that the period
of suspension of a suspended sentence must begin running upon
the trial court’s pronouncement of the suspension.”213 The Court of
Appeals of Virginia disagreed and held that “there is no statute or
case law requiring a period of suspension to begin upon the trial
court’s pronouncement of the suspension of a sentence.”214 It explained that there are two periods of good behavior: one period
while the defendant is incarcerated and one period while the defendant is on probation.215 The Court then turned to the revocation
order and held that the Suffolk City Circuit Court clearly intended
to have the period of good behavior commence upon “release from
confinement.”216
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Id. at 323–24, 836 S.E.2d at 3–4.
Id. at 324–25, 836 S.E.2d at 4.
Id. at 329, 836 S.E.2d at 6; VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285.2(E)(i) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
Id. at 330, 836 S.E.2d at 6–7.
Id. at 332, 836 S.E.2d at 7–8.
Id. at 333, 836 S.E.2d at 8.
71 Va. App. 205, 207, 834 S.E.2d 525, 526 (2019).
Id. at 213, 834 S.E.2d at 530.
Id. at 213, 834 S.E.2d at 529.
Id. at 213, 834 S.E.2d at 530.
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In Davis v. Commonwealth, Davis was convicted of malicious
wounding and robbery in 1995 and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment on each charge, with fourteen suspended.217 In 2006,
the appellant committed a murder, and in 2018, after hearing evidence regarding the murder, the Sussex County Circuit Court revoked the appellant’s 1995 suspensions and imposed the remaining time.218 On appeal, the appellant alleged that the trial court
lacked authority to revoke his suspended sentence for the 1995 malicious wounding.219 The court of appeals disagreed, finding that
the trial court’s interpretation of the language of its original sentencing order that the sentence be suspended for the “maximum
period required by law” meant that the sentence was “suspended
as long as the law allowed.”220 Accordingly, the trial court had suspended the sentence for the duration of the appellant’s life, thus
the trial court correctly concluded that the suspended sentence
could be revoked.221
R. Severance
In Cousett v. Commonwealth, Cousett argued that the Virginia
Beach Circuit Court erred in failing to sever his charges involving
one victim from the charges involving another.222 On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by refusing to sever the two incidents, as the Commonwealth had not satisfied Rule 3A:10(c) by
showing that justice did not require separate trials and by showing
that the offenses met the requirements of Rule 3A:6.223 The court
of appeals agreed with the appellant, holding that the Commonwealth had only argued that the offenses were a “common scheme”
under Rule 3A:6(b), and that it had failed to establish that by showing that the offenses were “‘closely connected in time, place, and
means of commission,” as the only commonalities were the entry of
the residences of two female victims (“I.P.” and “T.H.”) through unlocked front doors.224 However, the Court found that the refusal to
217. 70 Va. App. 722, 725, 833 S.E.2d 87, 88 (2019).
218. Id. at 725–26, 833 S.E.2d at 88.
219. Id. at 730–31, 833 S.E.2d at 91.
220. Id. at 732, 833 S.E.2d at 91.
221. Id. at 731–34, 833 S.E.2d at 91–92.
222. 71 Va. App. 49, 53–54, 833 S.E.2d 908, 910–11 (2019).
223. Id. at 54, 833 S.E.2d at 910–11; VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:10(c), 3A:6 (Repl. Vol. 2021).
224. Cousett, 71 Va. App. at 59, 833 S.E.2d at 913 (quoting Walker v. Commonwealth,
289 Va. 410, 416, 770 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2015)).

2021]

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

61

sever was harmless, as the evidence of crimes against I.P. and her
identification of the appellant would have been admissible at a separate trial for the offenses against T.H.225 The evidence that a
Black male entered two apartments of lone females the same way,
close in time and location, while carrying a white bag, would have
been admissible “other crimes” evidence of identity had there been
separate trials.226 Accordingly, as the evidence would have been
admissible anyway, the error in failing to sever the trials was
harmless, and the convictions were affirmed.227
S. Sex Offender Registry
In Bailey v. Commonwealth, Bailey was convicted of failing to
re-register as a sex offender, second offense.228 Bailey argued that
Virginia Code section 18.2-472.1 is unconstitutional because it infringed on his First Amendment rights.229 Section 18.2-472.1 requires a sex offender to comply with section 9.1-903, which requires, in part, that a sex offender provide law enforcement with
the sex offender’s identifying electronic information, such as an email address or screen name.230 Bailey failed to do so and admitted
to having a Facebook account.231 The Court of Appeals of Virginia
determined that the statute did not unduly infringe on his First
Amendment rights because the statute merely required that the
sex offender provide law enforcement with electronic identifying
information; the statute did not require that the sex offender report the content of postings.232
T. Venue
In Tanner v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
dealt with the venue for an obstruction of justice conviction and
whether or not an attempted crime could serve as the underlying
felony for obstruction of justice.233 Tanner was arrested while
225.
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Id. at 62–63, 833 S.E.2d at 914–15.
Id. at 62–63, 833 S.E.2d at 915.
Id. at 63, 833 S.E.2d at 915.
70 Va. App. 634, 636, 830 S.E.2d 62, 63 (2019).
Id. at 636, 830 S.E.2d at 63; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-472.1 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
Bailey, 70 Va. App. at 637, 830 S.E.2d at 63; § 9.1-903 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
70 Va. App. at 637–38, 830 S.E.2d at 64.
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72 Va. App. 86, 92, 841 S.E.2d 377, 380 (2020).
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attempting to burn down the victim’s residence and later called the
victim and threatened her if she participated in the trial.234 Tanner
was convicted of attempted arson and felony obstruction of justice.235
On appeal, he argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish venue for the obstruction offense because there was no evidence of where the appellant or the victim was when the phone call
took place.236 The Court rejected this argument because the appellant’s phone call was an attempt to prevent the witness from appearing, and therefore it was an attempt to “obstruct or impede the
administration of justice in [the] court” where he was to be tried,
which is sufficient to satisfy venue.237 The Court also rejected the
appellant’s contention that he could not be convicted of obstruction
because no harm occurred in the jurisdiction as the witness appeared and testified against him.238 The Court held that because
Virginia Code section 18.2-460 proscribes attempts to obstruct justice, the crime was complete when the appellant attempted to intimidate the witness, and no actual harm was necessary.239
In Bryant v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether the Arlington County Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction and venue over a credit card theft charge
under Virginia Code section 18.2-192 when there was no evidence
that the defendant had stolen the credit cards in Arlington
County.240 The Court explained that the “General Assembly [via
section 17.1-513] has granted the circuit courts subject matter jurisdiction over the specific class of cases involving the prosecution
of felonious crimes . . . which unquestionably includes the prosecution of felony credit card theft.”241 The Court also held that the trial
court had venue because section 18.2-198.1 specifies that a court
has venue “where a credit card number is used, is attempted to be
used, or is possessed with intent to violate [sections] 18.2-193, 18.2195, or 18.2-197,” and the appellant had possessed stolen credit
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Id. at 92–93, 841 S.E.2d at 380.
Id. at 93, 841 S.E.2d at 381.
Id. at 94, 96, 841 S.E.2d at 381–82.
Id. at 96–97, 841 S.E.2d at 382.
Id. at 97, 841 S.E.2d at 382.
Id. at 94, 97, 841 S.E.2d at 381–82; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-460 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
70 Va. App. 697, 707–08, 832 S.E.2d 48, 53 (2019); § 18.2-192 (Repl. Vol. 2014).
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cards with the intent to commit credit card fraud in Arlington
County.242
U. Verdicts
In Kenner v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that a motion to poll the jury as to the verdict was untimely when Kenner moved to poll the jury at the conclusion of arguments during the sentencing phase.243 The Court concluded that
the proper time to have the jury polled as to the verdict, pursuant
to Rule 3A:17, is when the verdict is returned.244
V. Witnesses
In Palmer v. Commonwealth, Palmer was convicted of aggravated malicious wounding because he stabbed and slashed his wife
fourteen times.245 At trial, the Commonwealth called the wife to
the stand, and she invoked her Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.246 The prosecutor noted that the wife had pending charges against her for child neglect, and a prosecutor and city
attorney involved in that case were present to observe her testimony.247 The Virginia Beach City Circuit Court found that the wife
was in legal peril and could legitimately invoke the Fifth Amendment.248 The Commonwealth then had the wife declared unavailable and introduced her testimony from the preliminary hearing,
over Palmer’s objection.249 On appeal, Palmer challenged the wife’s
invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights and the Commonwealth’s introduction of her prior testimony.250 The Court of Appeals of Virginia determined that the wife’s invocation was legitimate because of her pending charges and the presence of interested
parties observing her testimony; as to the use of the prior

242. Bryant, 70 Va. App. 713–14, 832 S.E.2d at 56–57; §§ 18.2-198.1, -193, -195, -197
(Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2021).
243. 299 Va. 414, 428–29, 854 S.E.2d 493, 500–01 (2021).
244. Id. at 430, 854 S.E.2d at 501–02; VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:17 (Repl. Vol. 2021).
245. 71 Va. App. 225, 228, 231, 835 S.E.2d 80, 82–83 (2019).
246. Id. at 228–30, 835 S.E.2d at 82–83.
247. Id. at 229–30, 835 S.E.2d at 82–83.
248. Id. at 230, 835 S.E.2d at 83.
249. Id. at 230–31, 835 S.E.2d at 83.
250. Id. at 232, 835 S.E.2d at 84.
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testimony, the court of appeals determined that this was proper
because the witness was unavailable.251
II. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Abduction
In Boyd v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed a parental abduction case on the issue of sufficiency of the
evidence establishing wrongful conduct.252 It applied the plain
meaning of the statute when it defined “wrongful” as “unlawful or
contrary to the law.”253 The Court found the appellant “acted in
direct contravention of the . . . custody order,” and therefore acted
wrongfully.254
B. Animal Cruelty
In Blankenship v. Commonwealth, Blankenship alleged that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for animal cruelty because there was insufficient evidence to show that he “willfully inflict[ed] inhumane injury or pain” on a police dog because
there was no evidence the dog experienced pain and the appellant’s
actions were necessary to keep him from being bitten.255 The court
of appeals found that there was sufficient evidence of pain, as the
dog hesitated after being struck and kicked by the appellant, which
the officers testified was not typical of him, and the dog’s veterinarian testified that the dog suffered a digestive injury.256
C. Assault
In Lopez v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
found that the evidence was sufficient to support the assault and
battery of a law enforcement officer, despite Lopez’s argument that
the officer initiated the conduct, not Lopez.257 The Court found that
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72 Va. App. 274, 844 S.E.2d 425 (2020).
Id. at 280, 844 S.E.2d at 428.
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there was evidence in the record of several instances of Lopez
touching the officer in an offensive manner, such as shoving the
officer’s chest and face and grabbing the officer’s head and shoulders.258 Thus, the Chesapeake City Circuit Court could disbelieve
Lopez’s self-serving testimony and conclude that the Commonwealth’s witnesses were more credible.259
D. Burglary
In Pooler v. Commonwealth, the court of appeals affirmed
Pooler’s convictions for burglary and assault and battery.260 The
appellant was romantically involved with the victim and occasionally stayed at the victim’s residence, although she did not have permission to be there when the victim was not there.261 The appellant
also kept some personal items in the victim’s home, had a key, and
assisted in paying utility bills.262 On the evening of the offense, the
appellant had not been invited to the victim’s residence; however,
she arrived there with an accomplice, kicked open the front door,
and confronted the victim and another woman.263 The court of appeals determined that the appellant had no property interest in the
residence.264 While she occasionally spent the night there, she had
no right to occupy; accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to
demonstrate that it belonged to another.265 The Court also found
that Pooler was not invited; the appellant’s entry was not permitted and was thus a “breaking.”266
E. Cigarette Trafficking
In Jiddou v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
affirmed Jiddou’s convictions of two counts of fraudulently purchasing cigarettes, three counts of possessing with the intent to
distribute tax-paid contraband cigarettes, and two counts of money
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71 Va. App. 214, 218, 834 S.E.2d 530, 532 (2019).
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Id. at 218–19, 834 S.E.2d at 532.
Id. at 222, 834 S.E.2d at 534.
Id. at 222, 834 S.E.2d at 534.
Id. at 224, 834 S.E.2d at 535.

66

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:37

laundering.267 The evidence demonstrated that on three separate
occasions, Jiddou purchased large quantities of cigarettes from a
Sam’s Club using a defunct retail business license, which enabled
him to make the purchases without paying sales tax.268 On appeal,
Jiddou argued that the business’ ST-10 form, the exemption to pay
sales tax, was still valid because it had not been revoked in writing
by the Department of Taxation.269 The court of appeals determined,
however, that the ST-10 form had expired because of the operation
of law; the business’ ST-4 form, its certificate of registration, had
expired when Jiddou sold the business approximately two years
before the illegal purchases.270
F. Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor
In Spell v. Commonwealth, the court of appeals held that the
evidence was insufficient to support the appellant’s conviction of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor.271 The evidence at trial
established that the appellant was late picking up her daughter
from school, appeared drowsy, and drove poorly on the way home,
weaving into the other lane of traffic and rear-ending another
car.272 The daughter testified that she was “really scared” and
called 911 from the back of the vehicle.273 While the daughter was
on the phone with police, the appellant arrived at her house.274
When deputies arrived several minutes later, they conducted field
sobriety tests on the appellant, some of which she passed and others she failed.275 The deputies placed her under arrest, and a subsequent test of her blood was negative for alcohol but did show the
presence of the prescription drug Lorazepam at levels consistent
with a minimum therapeutic dose to treat anxiety.276 The court of
appeals held that, although Virginia Code section 18.2-371 allows
for four theories regarding the condition of a child to support a conviction under the section, the court only instructed the jury as to
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the “child in need of services” theory.277 Section 16.1-228 requires
the Commonwealth to prove three elements to show a “child in
need of services:”
(i) The conduct complained of must present a clear and substantial
danger to the child’s life or health or to the life and health of another
person, (ii) the child or his family is in need of treatment, rehabilitation or services not presently being received, and (iii) the intervention
of the court is essential to provide the treatment, rehabilitation or services needed by the child or his family.278

The appellate court concluded that there was insufficient evidence
that the daughter was in need of treatment or that the Stafford
County Circuit Court’s intervention was necessary.279
G. Disarming a Police Officer
In Lopez v. Commonwealth, the court of appeals found the evidence sufficient to support Lopez’s conviction for disarming a law
enforcement officer, as Lopez’s actions showed more than just an
attempt to retreat and avoid the officers; rather, Lopez engaged in
combat with the officer and made threatening statements which
allowed the trial court to disbelieve Lopez’s argument that he
merely was attempting to retreat from the officers.280
H. Drug Offenses
In Lambert v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the defendant had self-administered intoxicants that impaired his ability to drive safely and upheld the conviction of aggravated involuntary manslaughter.281 The Court explained that
the “evidence concerning the presence of intoxicants in [the defendant’s] blood, sufficient to impair his ability to drive safely, was undisputed.”282 Additionally, the Court found that Lambert self-administered the drugs when he received methadone from his
voluntary participation in a methadone clinic.283
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In Bagley v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
determined that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I or II substance because the appellant’s status as the driver of the car, his
proximity to the drugs under the driver seat and in the driver-side
door jamb, his furtive movements toward the location where the
drugs were found immediately upon the arrival of the police, and
his attempt to leave the car as quickly as he could when he saw the
officers allowed a reasonable factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant constructively possessed the
drugs and thus was guilty of the charged offense.284
In Yerling v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
overturned the appellant’s conviction for possession of oxycodone
because there was insufficient evidence that he was aware of the
presence and character of the drug.285 Viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, Yerling was pulled over for
speeding.286 When the police officer approached the driver’s side,
he noticed an odor of marijuana and that Yerling was breathing
heavy and almost sweating.287 During the search, a police officer
discovered a small corner baggie of marijuana in the console and a
pill, which later was confirmed to be oxycodone, also in the console
inside a balled up sheet of notebook paper.288 The Court explained
that even if Yerling was aware of the presence of the marijuana
based on its scent, there was no evidence he was aware of the oxycodone.289 Additionally, there was no evidence establishing that
Yerling knew the nature of the pill because it merely had ‘K-56’ on
it, and even the police officer had to call poison control to try to
determine the nature of the pill.290
I. Firearms Offenses
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals of Virginia in a case of first impression in

284. 73 Va. App. 1, 28–29, 854 S.E.2d 177, 190 (2021).
285. 71 Va. App. 527, 530–31, 838 S.E.2d 66, 67–68 (2020).
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Commonwealth v. Groffel.291 At the time of his arrest, Groffel had
a revolver strapped to his ankle and he was subject to five different
protective orders.292 While in jail, he called a neighbor and asked
him to sell some property Groffel kept in a shed.293 The neighbor
located an AK-47 assault rifle, a 12-gauge shotgun, ammunition
for those weapons, and ammunition for a “30-30” rifle in the
shed.294 Groffel was convicted of five counts of transporting a firearm while subject to a protective order and two counts of possessing a firearm or ammunition after having previously been convicted of a felony.295
Groffel appealed, seeking to reverse four of his convictions for
transporting a firearm while subject to a protective order and one
of his convictions for possession of a firearm or ammunition after
having previously been convicted of a felony; he argued that the
multiple convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.296 The
Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the multiple convictions for
transporting a firearm while subject to a protective order, determining that the gravamen of Virginia Code section 18.2-308.1:4(A)
was the protection of an individual covered by a protective order.297
Accordingly, the single act of transporting the revolver while subject to five different protective orders resulted in five different convictions.298 The court of appeals reversed, however, concerning the
possession of a firearm or ammunition; the Court concluded that
the gravamen of section 18.2-308.2 was the act of possession.299 Accordingly, even if a felon possesses 100 guns at the same time, they
may only be convicted of one count of section 18.2-308.2.300
In Williams v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
determined that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Williams’s
conviction for possession of a stolen gun.301 The appellate court determined that Williams’s hypotheses of innocence did not equate to
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innocence, and the jury was entitled to discredit Williams’s theories.302 Moreover, there was evidence that Williams was evasive in
answering the officer’s questions and initially refused to get out of
the car.303 Additionally, when informed that the gun was stolen,
Williams did not seem surprised, would not identify the person he
bought it from, and stated that the charges would get “lost in
court.”304
In Murray v. Commonwealth, Murray alleged that the evidence
was insufficient to show that she knowingly and intentionally possessed the firearm.305 The location of the gun, the lack of other passengers in the car, the appellant’s flight, the magazine dropped as
she fled, and her statements to police that she knew the firearm
was in the vehicle and was trying to return it provided ample evidence to prove knowing and intentional possession.306 Accordingly,
the appellant’s conviction was affirmed.307
J. Fraud
In Sarka v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that the evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant of
fraudulently failing to return leased property, in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-118.308 Applying Virginia Commercial Code
section 8.2A-202, the Court turned to the express terms of the
rental agreement over the course of performance and determined
the expiration date was expressly stated in the agreement.309 The
Court also noted “that written notice of default is not required for
a conviction under [Virginia] Code [section] 18.2-118,” and there
was ample circumstantial evidence of the appellant’s intent to defraud.”310

302. Id. at 485–86, 837 S.E.2d at 102–03.
303. Id. at 486, 837 S.E.2d at 103.
304. Id. at 486, 837 S.E.2d at 103.
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306. Id. at 461, 837 S.E.2d at 91.
307. Id. at 461, 837 S.E.2d at 91.
308. 73 Va. App. 56, 69, 854 S.E.2d 204, 210 (2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-118 (Repl. Vol.
2014).
309. Sarka, 73 Va. App. at 64–66, 854 S.E.2d at 208–09; § 8.2A-202 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
310. Sarka, 73 Va. App. at 67, 854 S.E.2d at 209 (explaining that the letter sent to the
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In Brewer v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that “the plain language of [Virginia] Code [section] 18.2152.3 supports the conclusion that the appellant’s iPhone, a cellular smart phone, fell within the statutory definition of computer”
as defined by the statute.311 The appellant had used his iPhone to
access the Internet and used a mobile app to transfer money from
one bank account to the other.312
K. Malicious Wounding
In Palmer v. Commonwealth, Palmer argued that the evidence
was insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated malicious
wounding because he acted in the heat of passion such that the
element of malice was negated.313 The Court of Appeals of Virginia
disagreed, noting that the argument between Palmer and his wife
could not constitute heat of passion.314 The Court noted, moreover,
that there was ample evidence that Palmer acted with malice: he
returned an hour or two after the argument carrying two knives,
which are deadly weapons, and he stabbed the wife fourteen
times.315 Additionally, when the couple’s young daughter attempted to intervene, Palmer threatened to kill the wife if the
daughter sought help.316
In Goodwin v. Commonwealth, Goodwin argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for malicious
wounding, as his participation was minimal and did not establish
his guilt under a concert of action theory.317 The court of appeals
rejected both of these contentions, as the evidence, including a
video, established that the appellant kicked the victim at least four
times and made contact with the victim’s left arm with his
shield.318 Thus, the evidence was clearly sufficient to show that the
appellant’s participation was not minimal and was not part of a
concert of action, but that the appellant actually struck the victim,
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who suffered a fractured left arm.319 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellant’s conviction.320
L. Obstruction of Justice
In Tanner v. Commonwealth, Tanner contended that the felony
obstruction of justice statute proscribes obstructive acts designed
to interfere with a prosecution for an offense or conspiracy to commit an offense but does not cover obstruction related to an attempted crime; thus, the Charles City County Circuit Court’s conviction of him for obstruction related to an attempted arson was
erroneous.321 The court of appeals interpreted Virginia Code sections 18.2-77, 18.2-460, and 17.1-805 and found that as section
18.2-460 incorporated “any violent felony offense” listed in section
17.1-805, it thereby incorporated an attempt to commit a violent
felony offense, as section 17.1-805 expressly includes “any conspiracy or attempt” in its definition of “violent felony offenses.”322 Accordingly, the court affirmed the appellant’s convictions.323
M. Protective Orders
In Green v. Commonwealth, Green argued that the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction for violating a protective order.324 The evidence at trial established that, after a burglary, the
appellant posted a message on Twitter stating “Someone tell my
BM she was a bird for me,” meaning, roughly, someone tell my
“baby mama” that she was “nothing” or a “ho.”325 The appellant
was prohibited from contacting his “baby mama” by the protective
order, and on appeal, he alleged that this message did not amount
to contacting her, as it was posted on a public forum and not directly sent to her.326 The court of appeals held that the post was
not a generic comment, but rather intentionally directed another
person to contact the victim and relay the message; thus, the
319. Id. at 148–49, 834 S.E.2d at 498.
320. Id. at 149–50, 834 S.E.2d at 498.
321. 72 Va. App. 86, 98, 841 S.E.2d 377, 383 (2020).
322. Id. at 101–03, 841 S.E.2d at 385; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-77, -460, 17.1-805 (Repl.
Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2021).
323. Tanner, 72 Va. App. at 103, 841 S.E.2d at 385.
324. 72 Va. App. 193, 201, 843 S.E.2d 389, 393 (2020).
325. Id. at 198, 843 S.E.2d at 392.
326. Id. at 201–02, 843 S.E.2d at 393–94.
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communication was directed at the victim, and, therefore, the appellant was contacting the victim, albeit indirectly.327 Accordingly,
the court of appeals affirmed both of the appellant’s convictions.328
N. Resisting Arrest
In Lopez v. Commonwealth, Lopez argued that the Chesapeake
City Circuit Court erred when it convicted him of escaping from
custody because there was no evidence that Lopez was charged
with a criminal offense at the point of his initial arrest.329 The facts
established that Lopez was subject to a capias for his arrest.330 The
Court of Appeals of Virginia determined that the capias at issue
was for a charge of criminal contempt, and that the matter underlying the capias was a failure to comply with conditions arising out
of an assault and battery charge, a criminal offense.331 The Court
also noted that title 18.2 is titled “Crimes and Offenses Generally,”
and that chapter 10, where the code section is located, is titled
“Crimes Against the Administration of Justice.”332 Accordingly, the
Court affirmed the conviction and found that “on a charge of criminal offense” in section 18.2-478 includes a capias for contempt of
court, provided the capias specifies a criminal statute.333
O. Self-Defense
In Jones v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia addressed Jones’ appeal of his convictions of first-degree murder and
use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.334 Jones challenged
the Portsmouth City Circuit Court’s ruling that there was no overt
act sufficient to justify a self-defense claim.335 The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court’s ruling, stating that “nothing . . . sufficiently even minimally established the overt act requirement.”336
The evidence in this case established that the victim had looked
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entirely at his cell phone until he was shot and never reached for
his waistband.337 Additionally, the Court highlighted that “it appears from the video that [the victim] was not even aware of Jones’s
presence until Jones opened fire on him.”338
P. Sex Offenses
In Ferguson v. Commonwealth, Ferguson entered a conditional
guilty plea to a violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-366 for having sexual intercourse with his eighteen-year-old stepdaughter, reserving the right to appeal the issue of the constitutionality of section 18.2-366.339 The Court expressed some doubts as to whether
the statute actually applied to intercourse between an adult stepchild and the stepparent, but assumed without deciding that it
did.340 Assuming that the statute did criminalize the appellant’s
conduct, the Court found that it was not unconstitutional, as the
concerns outlined in Lawrence v. Texas,341 relationships where one
party might be injured or coerced, or where consent might not be
easily refused, were implicated by a relationship between a stepparent and stepchild.342 Accordingly, the state had a legitimate interest in criminalizing them, and the appellant’s constitutional
challenge failed.343
In Alvarez Saucedo v. Commonwealth, the court of appeals held
that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the sodomy conviction
because sodomy by cunnilingus merely requires penetration of the
vulva, and the victim testified the defendant licked around her
vagina.344
Q. Trespassing
In Green v. Commonwealth, Green argued that his conviction for
common-law trespass precluded his conviction for burglary arising
out of the same events, as the burglary statute specifically excludes
337. Id. at 87, 822 S.E.2d at 926.
338. Id. at 87, 822 S.E.2d at 926.
339. 71 Va. App. 546, 549–50, 838 S.E.2d 75, 77 (2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-366 (Cum.
Supp. 2021).
340. Ferguson, 71 Va. App. at 553–57, 838 S.E.2d at 79–81.
341. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
342. Ferguson, 71 Va. App. at 558–60, 838 S.E.2d at 81–82.
343. Id. at 561, 838 S.E.2d at 83.
344. 71 Va. App. at 48–49, 833 S.E.2d at 908.
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trespass from constituting a basis for burglary.345 The Court of Appeals of Virginia rejected this argument, as the evidence clearly
showed that the appellant entered the residence with the intent to
commit other misdemeanors in addition to the trespass; in other
words, the fact that the appellant intended to commit a trespass
during his entry does not preclude his intent to commit another
misdemeanor and his conviction for that.346
R. Unauthorized Use
In Otey v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia determined that there was sufficient evidence to support Otey’s conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.347 The owner of the
vehicle gave it to Otey to repair the brake lines; there was no written agreement concerning the repairs.348 When the owner was unable to contact Otey, he reported the vehicle as stolen.349 Eventually, the owner recovered the vehicle and observed new damage to
the rear bumper and frame.350 Otey argued that the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction because the owner did not
place any time limitations on his use of the vehicle.351 The court of
appeals disagreed, ruling that Otey exceeded the scope of the
owner’s consent when he used the vehicle to tow or attempt to tow
Otey’s personal vehicle.352 Moreover, Otey admitted he drove the
vehicle more than he needed to test the repairs.353 Additionally,
there was sufficient evidence of the value of the vehicle because the
owner testified as to its value without objection.354

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

72 Va. App. at 196, 843 S.E.2d at 391.
Id. at 201, 843 S.E.2d at 393.
71 Va. App. 792, 799–800, 839 S.E.2d 921, 925 (2020).
Id. at 795, 839 S.E.2d at 923.
Id. at 795, 839 S.E.2d at 923.
Id. at 796, 839 S.E.2d at 923.
Id. at 797–98, 839 S.E.2d at 924.
Id. at 798–800, 839 S.E.2d at 924–25.
Id. at 798–800, 839 S.E.2d at 924–25.
Id. at 800–01, 839 S.E.2d at 925.
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III. LEGISLATION
A. Animal Cruelty
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code sections 3.26511.1 and 3.2-6511.2 by forbidding anyone convicted of a violation
of section 3.2-6570 (animal cruelty) from being an owner, director,
officer, manager, operator, staff member, or animal caregiver of a
pet shop or commercial dog breeder.355 Additionally, the General
Assembly now requires a pet shop to obtain a signed statement
from the purchaser or adopter that the person has never been convicted of animal cruelty prior to purchasing or adopting a dog.356
B. Bail
The General Assembly eliminated the presumption against
bail.357 Virginia Code section 19.2-120 will now provide that a defendant shall be admitted to bail, unless there is probable cause to
believe that: (1) the defendant will not appear in court; or (2) the
defendant poses an unreasonable danger to themselves, family or
household members, or the public.358
C. Commercial Driver’s License
The General Assembly disqualified any person convicted of a felony involving an act or practice of severe forms of trafficking in
persons while driving a commercial motor vehicle from holding a
commercial driver’s license.359
D. Dangerous Dogs
The General Assembly amended and added several new sections
concerning dangerous dogs.360 For a dog to be adjudicated
355. Act of Mar. 24, 2021, ch. 339, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 3.2-6511.1, -6511.2 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
356. Id. at __.
357. Act of Mar. 24, 2021, ch. 337, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 19.2120, -124 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
358. Id. at __.
359. Act of Mar. 18, 2021, ch. 136, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 46.2341.18, -382, -1702 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
360. See Act of Mar. 31, 2021, ch. 464, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at
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dangerous, the Commonwealth must prove that it killed a companion animal that is a dog or cat, inflicted serious injury on that animal, or directly caused serious injury to a person.361 The statute
imposes obligations on the owner of a dangerous dog, such as requiring the animal to wear a special identification on its collar,
providing documentation that the animal has been spayed or neutered, and registering the dog on the dangerous dog registry.362 The
owner of a dangerous dog must notify animal control of new attacks, any change of address, transfer of ownership, or if the dog
has gotten loose.363 The statute also permits condominium associations or homeowners’ associations to ban the keeping of dangerous dogs.364 The statute also provides that the owner of a dangerous dog may face penalties for violating the section, including
criminal penalties for failing to comply with the statute or if a dangerous dog attacks another companion animal or a person.365
E. Death Threats
It is now illegal in Virginia, punishable as a Class 5 felony, for
anyone to communicate a threat in writing to another person to kill
or do serious bodily injury to another person with the intent to “(i)
intimidate a civilian population at large; (ii) influence the conduct
or activities of a government, . . . ; or (iii) compel the emergency
evacuation . . . of any place of assembly. . . .”366 If the perpetrator
is a minor, this crime is punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor.367
F. Driving Offenses
The General Assembly repealed the remaining provisions of the
habitual offender law, concerning driving offenses, and requires reinstatement of a person’s driver’s license if the license was suspended or revoked solely under the Habitual Offender Act.368

§ 3.2-6540, -6542 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
361. Id. at __.
362. Id. at __.
363. Id. at __.
364. Id. at __.
365. Id. at __.
366. See Act of Mar. 11, 2021, ch. 83, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at § 18.260 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
367. Id. at __.
368. Act of Mar. 31, 2021, ch. 463, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 8.01-
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The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 46.2-839
to require drivers of motor vehicles to change lanes when overtaking bicycles, mopeds, and similar vehicles, if the overtaking cannot
be completed safely (defined as providing the overtaken conveyance three feet of space) in a single lane.369 The bill also amends
section 46.2-905, which currently permits riders of bicycles, scooters, or motorized skateboards to ride two abreast, but requires
those riders to go single file if a motor vehicle attempts to overtake
them.370 The amendment permits those riders to continue riding
two abreast.371
G. Drug Offenses
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 18.2251.03, which is the safe harbor from prosecution for an individual
who reports his or her own or another’s overdose.372 The Legislature added to the safe harbor provision those who attempt to provide medical care or the administration of naloxone or other “opioid
antagonist.”373
H. Evidence
The General Assembly created a new Virginia Code section 19.1271.6, which permits the introduction of evidence of a defendant’s
mental condition.374 The statute provides that evidence of a defendant’s mental condition at the time of the commission of the offense
is relevant and, provided it does not go to an ultimate issue of fact,
may be admitted to show that the defendant did not have the intent required to commit the charged offense.375 The General Assembly also amended various other statutes to permit the

9, -407, 16.1-77, -305, 17.1-213, 19.2-389 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
369. Act of Mar. 31, 2021, ch. 462, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 46.2839, -905 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
370. Id. at __.
371. Id. at __.
372. Act of Feb. 25, 2021, ch. 29, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at § 18.2251.03 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
373. Id. at __.
374. Act of Apr. 7, 2021, ch. 540, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 19.2120, -163.03, -299, 37.2-808 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
375. Id. at __.
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consideration of a defendant’s mental condition for other things,
such as in bail considerations or in a presentence report.376
I. Firearms Offenses
The General Assembly enacted a new Virginia Code section 18.2283.2, which prohibits the carrying of firearms or explosive material in the Capitol, Capitol Square, any state-owned building, or
any office in which state employees regularly work.377 Violation of
the statute is punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor.378
J. Hate Crimes
The General Assembly criminalized when a person intentionally
gives a false report, causes someone else to give a false report, or
summons law enforcement against another person based on that
person’s race as a Class 6 felony.379
K. Juvenile Justice
Under new legislation, juveniles may only be committed to the
Department of Juvenile Justice if the juvenile is adjudicated delinquent of a violent juvenile felony and is eleven years of age or older,
or is fourteen years of age or older.380 No juvenile younger than
eleven years of age may be detained in a secure facility prior to a
final order unless he is alleged to have committed a violent felony,
in which case he may be detained in an approved foster home, a
facility operated by a licensed welfare agency, or another suitable
nonsecure detention facility designated by the court and approved
by the Department.381

376. Id. at __.
377. Act of Apr. 7, 2021, ch. 548, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at § 18.2283.2 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
378. Id. at __.
379. See Act of Oct. 21, 2020, ch. 22, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at § 18.2461 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
380. See Act of Mar. 12, 2021, ch. 115, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended
at §§ 16.1-248.1, -278.7 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
381. Id. at __.
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L. Larceny
The General Assembly repealed Virginia Code section 18.2-104,
which set out punishments for a second or subsequent conviction
of larceny.382
M. Marijuana Legalization
In 2021, the General Assembly passed sweeping marijuana legalization reform.383 Virginia eliminated criminal penalties for
simple possession of up to one ounce of marijuana by persons
twenty-one years of age or older.384 Possession of more than one
ounce but less than one pound of marijuana is punishable by a
twenty-five dollar civil penalty.385 Possession of more than one
pound of marijuana is an unclassified felony that is punishable by
up to ten years in prison.386
Additionally, Virginians can now grow up to four marijuana
plants if the plant has a tag with the grower’s name, driver’s license number, and a notation that states it is for personal use.387
The civil penalty for possession of 5 to 10 plants is $250 for a first
offense, a Class 3 misdemeanor for a second offense, and a Class 2
misdemeanor for a third or subsequent offense.388 The penalty for
possession of more than 10 plants but not more than 49 plants is a
Class 1 misdemeanor.389 Possession of 49 plants to 100 plants is a
Class 6 felony.390 Finally, possession of more than 100 plants is an
unclassified felony, punishable by one to ten years in prison and a
fine of not more than $250,000.391

382. Act of Mar. 18, 2021, ch. 192, 2021 Va. Acts __, __.
383. See Act of Apr. 7, 2021, ch. 550, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 4.11100 to -1105, -1302 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
384. Id. at __.
385. Id. at __; see also Act of Oct. 13, 2020, ch. 3, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended
at § 18.2-250.1 (Cum. Supp. 2021)) (making possession of marijuana violations a pre-payable
offense).
386. Act of Apr. 7, 2021, ch. 550, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 4.1-1100
to -1105, 1302 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
387. Id. at __.
388. Id. at __.
389. Id. at __.
390. Id. at __.
391. Id. at __.
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There is no criminal or civil liability for giving up to one ounce
of marijuana to another person over the age of twenty-one.392 However, it is a Class 2 misdemeanor to illegally sell, give, or distribute
marijuana for a first-time offense and a Class 1 misdemeanor for a
second or subsequent offense.393 It is a Class 1 misdemeanor to illegally sell, give, or distribute marijuana to a person under the age
of twenty-one.394
The law also prohibits searches based upon the odor of marijuana.395
N. Plea Bargaining
The General Assembly added a new Virginia Code section 19.2298.02 that permits a criminal defendant and the Commonwealth
to enter into an agreement at any time, even after the entry of a
conviction order, to defer proceedings and continue the case for final disposition on the agreement of the parties.396 Notably, the new
statute provides that a defendant who fulfills the conditions of the
agreement waives the right to appeal the entry of a final order.397
O. Police Reform
In 2020, the General Assembly passed legislation requiring a
law enforcement officer, “while in the performance of [their] official
duties,” to intervene if feasible to end or prevent further harm if
another officer uses excessive force and to render aid to any person
injured as the result of excessive force.398 This statute also requires
the officer to report the excessive force incident.399 Any officer who
knowingly violates this statute is subject to disciplinary action, including dismissal, demotion, suspension, transfer, or decertification.400
392. Id. at __.
393. Id. at __.
394. Id. at __.
395. Id. at __.
396. Act of Oct. 21, 2020, ch. 21, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at § 19.2298.02 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
397. Id. at __.
398. Act of Oct. 28, 2020, ch. 37, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 19.283.3 to -83.7 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
399. Id. at __.
400. Id. at __.
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The General Assembly prohibited the use of neck restraints by
police officers during an arrest or detention, unless the use of a
neck restraint is “immediately necessary” to protect the law enforcement officer or another person.401 The Legislature also provides that any law enforcement officer who utilizes a neck restraint
outside of the exception is subject to disciplinary action.402
P. Protective Orders
The 2021 General Assembly passed one law addressing preliminary child protective orders.403 A violation of a preliminary child
protective order is punishable as contempt of court; however, if the
violation involved an act or omission that endangered the child’s
life or health or resulted in bodily injury, the violation is punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor.404 Additionally, courts are no longer
required to enter a permanent family abuse protective order upon
a conviction of a violation of a preliminary child protective order.405
Q. Robbery
The 2021 General Assembly changed the penalties for robbery
based on the severity of the offense:
•

any person who commits robbery and causes serious bodily
injury or death to another person is guilty of a Class 2 felony;

•

any person who commits robbery by using or displaying a
firearm in a threatening manner is guilty of a Class 3 felony;

•

any person who commits robbery by physical force not resulting in serious bodily injury or by displaying or using another
deadly weapon is guilty of a Class 5 felony; and

•

any person who commits robbery by using threats or intimidation or any other means not involving a deadly weapon is
guilty of a Class 6 felony.406

401. Id. at __.
402. Id. at __.
403. See Act of Apr. 7, 2021, ch. 529, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 16.1253, -253.2 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
404. Id. at __.
405. Id. at __.
406. Act of Apr. 7, 2021, ch. 534, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 16.1269.1, 18.2-58 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
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R. Role of the Prosecutor
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 19.2265.6 by adding a new subsection (A), that provides that when the
Commonwealth moves to dismiss a charge, with or without prejudice, the court should grant the motion, unless it finds that the
motion was made as a result of bribery or bias toward a victim because of the victim’s race, religion, gender, disability, gender identity, sexual orientation, color, or national origin.407
S. Sentencing
As of 2020, Virginia no longer requires mandatory jury sentencing when a defendant or the Commonwealth has elected to proceed
with a jury trial.408
The General Assembly abolished the death penalty.409 Among
the provisions of the bill, there is no longer a capital offense in the
Virginia Code; capital murder is now referred to as “aggravated
murder.”410 The most severe penalty is now a life sentence without
parole.411
The General Assembly modified a circuit court’s probation and
suspension authority and added a new section 19.2-306.1.412 Under
the new legislation, a circuit court is limited to imposing a period
of probation that equals the maximum statutory period for which
the defendant may have been originally sentenced.413 The same is
true if the court suspends a portion of the sentence—that is, the
suspended portion can be only as long as the statutory maximum
to which the defendant may be sentenced.414 The new section 19.2306.1 defines a “technical violation” of a suspended sentence and

407. Act of Oct. 21, ch. 21, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at § 192-265.6 (Cum.
Supp. 2021)).
408. See Act of Nov. 5, 2020, ch. 43, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 19.2264.3, -288, -295, -295.1, 19.2-295.3 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
409. Act of Mar. 24, 2021, ch. 344, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 18.210, -18 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
410. Id. at __.
411. Id. at __.
412. Act of Apr. 7, 2021, ch. 538, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 19.2303, -303.1, -306.1 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
413. Id. at __.
414. Id. at __.
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limits the discretion of a court in sentencing a defendant for a technical violation.415
T. Sexual Offenses
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 18.2-64.2
by adding law enforcement officers to the class of people who can
be convicted of a Class 6 felony for having carnal knowledge of a
person detained or arrested, an inmate, parolee, probationer, juvenile detainee, or pretrial defendant.416
The General Assembly created a new chapter which permits victims of sex trafficking crimes to petition for a writ of vacatur.417
The statute defines “qualifying offense” and provides that anyone
convicted of a qualifying offense as a direct result of being “solicited, invited, recruited, encouraged, forced, intimidated, or deceived” by someone else may petition a circuit court for a writ of
vacatur of the offense.418 The statute delineates what a petition
should include and the possible responses by the Commonwealth.419 Any appeals from the circuit court’s decision go to the
Supreme Court of Virginia.420 If the petition is granted, then the
qualifying offense is expunged.421
Along with that, the General Assembly added a new Virginia
Code section 18.2-361.1, which provides for victims of sex trafficking to assert an affirmative defense to charges of prostitution or
residing in a “bawdy place.”422 A victim of sex trafficking may assert the defense where they were to engage in the offense through
force or intimidation, or the offense was committed at the direction
of someone else.423

415. Id. at __.
416. Act of Oct. 28, 2020, ch. 26, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at § 18.2-64.2
(Cum. Supp. 2021)).
417. Act of Apr. 7, 2021, ch. 543, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 19.2327.15, -327.20 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
418. Id. at __.
419. Id. at __.
420. Id. at __.
421. Id. at __.
422. Act of Mar. 24, 2021, ch. 334, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at § 18.2361.1 (Cum. Supp. 2021)); § 18.2-347 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
423. Id. at __.
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U. Warrants
The General Assembly outlawed “no-knock” warrants.424 The
statute requires law enforcement executing a search warrant to be
uniformed and to announce their presence and purpose.425 Additionally, the statute prohibits the execution of search warrants at
night, unless law enforcement demonstrates good cause for executing the warrant at night.426 If law enforcement violates this statute, any evidence recovered as a result of the search will be inadmissible.427 The General Assembly later amended this statute to
clarify that “daytime” is between the hours of 8:00 AM and 5:00
PM.428 A search warrant may be executed outside of this timeframe
if police lawfully entered the place to be searched and remained
there continuously, or if a judge or magistrate authorizes the execution of the search warrant for good cause shown.429 The 2021
amendment also requires the executing officer to not only leave the
warrant with someone or posted at the place to be searched, but
also the affidavit.430 After 5:00 PM, the law enforcement officer
may apply for a warrant from a magistrate and does not need to
make reasonable efforts to locate a judge, if circumstances call for
the execution of the warrant after 5:00 PM.431

424. Act of Oct. 28, 2020, ch. 31, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at § 19.2-56
(Cum. Supp. 2021)).
425. Id. at __.
426. Id. at __.
427. Id. at __.
428. Act of Mar. 1, 2021, ch. 34, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at § 19.2-56
(Cum. Supp. 2021)).
429. Id. at __.
430. Id. at __.
431. Id. at __.

